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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper considers conversations in and about education. To focus the 
discussion it uses the scenario of a conversation between a trainee teacher 
and her mentor reflecting together on a lesson that the trainee has just 
taught. I begin by outlining the notion of reflective practice as popularised 
by Donald Schön, and show how, in the scenario, the reflective practice 
conversation leads to talk characterised by recourse to particular dominant 
discourses within education, and how this in turn can lead to a certain 
voicelessness. I then consider what the possibilities for the reflective 
practice conversation might be, looking first at the Greek notion of 
parrhēsia and how this has been discussed in the work of Michel Foucault 
in contrast to other forms of talk such as rhetoric or chattering. I argue that, 
whilst the parrhēsiastic conversation may allow for the exploration of the 
relationships (between the mentor and the trainee, each participant and 
their words and a relationship of care for the self), such possibilities are 
fraught with difficulty. I then move to consider how such relationships 
might be developed through recognising the expressive aspects of 
language emphasised in Stanley Cavell’s notion of passionate utterance. I 
first trace the development of Cavell’s thought through John Austin’s 
contrast in language between the constative and the performative. I then 
illustrate the idea of passionate utterance from the films Cavell describes as 
the ‘Hollywood comedies of remarriage’, and argue that the passionate 
utterance opens up opportunities for the kind of conversation in education 
that is itself educative. 
 
Keywords: conversation; flattery; rhetoric; parrhēsia; performative, passionate 
utterance 
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Conversations: risk, passion and frank speaking in education 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scenario 
 
 
Teacher: Well, you’re nearing the end of this teaching placement, and you’ve built a 
good relationship with this class over the half-term; how did you feel that lesson 
went? 
 
 
Trainee: Yeah, fine. I’ve thought a lot about the conversation we had after my last 
observation. I know you said then I needed to be using more self-assessment and 
peer-assessment in my teaching, so I tried to do that today. So I should have better 
evidence now to show I’m meeting the part of the teaching standards on assessment, 
shouldn’t I? 
 
 
Teacher: Well, yes, that’s good, but you shouldn’t be restricting this to just one lesson, 
otherwise it all looks a bit ‘ad hoc’. You will need to show that you can use different 
types of assessment in all your lessons, across a whole topic that you’re teaching, for 
example, or in your plans for a whole term. When you’ve qualified and get a job in a 
school, your Head of Department will want to see the evidence of this in your 
planning documentation, and, of course, OfSTED1 will be looking to see that you’re 
competent in this too – that way you’ll get the higher grades. 
 
 
Trainee: I know, yeah. Sorry. I do think it’s a really good idea – trying out something 
new, you know.  I was meaning to change some of my lesson plans for next term, to 
include peer-assessment with this class every week. But I was asked to do some after- 
school revision classes over the last couple of weeks and was really pushed with time 
for getting the planning finished. I have thought about it, just not written up the plans. 
 
 
Teacher: It sounds as if you’ve got things in hand, then. I’ve talked to the school and 
they seem happy with the progress you’re making with things generally. It sounds as 
if you should get a good report at the end of this placement. 
 
 
Trainee: I’m a bit worried about jobs, though, for when I’ve finished – there don’t 
seem to be many being advertised yet. I really want to get the best grades to improve 
my chances, especially if there’s lots of competition. Do you think I’ve got a chance 
of getting a grade of outstanding overall? 
 
 
Teacher: Well, it is important you keep things going in the right direction. Don’t be 
thinking too much about jobs yet, just focus on building on your strengths and look 
 
 
 
*Email: a.fulford@leedstrinity.ac.uk 
 
1   The Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills – the 
regulatory and inspectorate body for England. OfSTED conduct periodic inspections 
of schools in England, grade school provision and report publicly on their findings. 
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carefully at the feedback I'm giving you, particularly around assessment. That's a 
really big focus for schools at the moment- it's all about being able to show that the 
kids are learning. How do they know that they've  understood something, and how do 
you know? So your lesson today was ok, but you've  still got next term to develop this 
aspect of your teaching, and you've  obviously got to be observed again, so we'll see. 
5 
 
 
 
Conversations and Voicelessness 
 
 
All kinds of conversation take place in education: some are themselves a form of 
education - we only to have took to Socratic dialogue to see this. The scenario that 
begins this paper, however, is from the context of initial teacher training. It is typical 
of the kind of conversation that takes place between a trainee teacher and a more 
experienced and qualified colleague/mentor who has observed the trainee delivering a 
lesson, and is giving feedback2. It raises two interesting questions: first, what is going 
on in this type of conversation, and second, how could things be different in a 
conversation about the practice of teaching? These questions are rather broad, so let 
me expand on them briefly. When I ask ‘What is going on in this type of 
conversation?’ I am not wishing to subject the language to the kind of discourse 
analysis that is common in, say, James Paul Gee’s work (2005). Whilst this might be 
interesting in studying how individuals enact specific social identities, my interest is 
rather in the forces that are at play in the conversation, in what we might call its 
emotional dynamics. 
But to consider how things could be different in a conversation about the 
practice of teaching requires that we give attention to the purpose of the conversation. 
Here, the teacher’s intention is to start a dialogue that enables the trainee to engage 
with her feedback through a process of ‘reflective practice’. Now widely promoted as 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2   For clarity, the term ‘teacher’ will be used throughout this paper to denote the 
experienced colleague/mentor who has formally observed the lesson, and who gives 
feedback, and ‘trainee’ to denote the individual who has been observed. 
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a means of improving teaching and learning in a range of professional settings3, 
reflective practice is often traced to the work of Donald Schön (1987, 1991). In 
promoting his ‘epistemology of practice’ (1991, viii), Schön shows how professionals 
characteristically reflect in and on action, both during and after practice, and in this 
way make sense of their work. 
The impact of Schön’s thinking has been significant4. But reflective practice, in 
its many iterations, tends to be at risk of being hijacked by instrumentalism (Bradbury 
et al. 2010). In education, it often equates to mere description of what happened in a 
class or to a regurgitation of standard responses. This is perhaps not unsurprising in an 
age of increasing regulation, managerialism and accountability. Given such 
constraints, the focus on the technical aspects of classroom practice (on planning, 
classroom management and the like), seem inevitable. This ‘standards-rich’ discourse 
is indicative of the ways in which both the teacher and the trainee (in the scenario) 
think, and of the power of certain discourses to authorise such thinking. It is as if the 
use of certain quasi-technical terminology has a stifling effect. This is not to say that 
some kind of technical vocabulary is wholly inappropriate for describing practices in 
education, but to draw attention to where the extent of this, and the aura 
of prestige and of professional expertise that it brings to mind, gets in the way of other 
kinds of thinking, or talking. Furthermore, where there is an ineluctable link between 
reflective practice and assessment, there is a tendency for the teacher to restrict her 
conversation with trainees to issues relating to the achievement of the all-important 
 
 
 
3   See, for example, the work of Mann et al. 2009 on reflective practice in the health 
professions. 
 
4   It has not, though, been without its critics. Some have questioned how the notion of 
reflective practice addresses praxis (see for example Usher et al. 1997). Schön’s idea 
of reflective practice has been subsequently developed, particularly in relation to 
health and related professions: see the work of Johns (1995) and Rolfe et al. (2001). 
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standards. For her part, the trainee - keen to meet the standards required to pass the 
course - wants detailed and specific feedback, but feedback confined to what she must 
do to pass. Whilst the trainee must master the technical aspects of her work, a 
conversation dominated by such issues neglects other (less easily measured) matters 
such as what teaching ‘is’ or what it is to become and to be a teacher. Yet, to ignore 
these is to diminish, in some way, both the trainee and the teacher; it is to fail to 
recognise adequately that teaching is an ethical pursuit5. 
To return to our scenario, we might think about this type of conversation in 
relation to Neil Mercer’s classification of talk, and in particular to his concept of 
‘interthinking’, or ‘the use of language and thinking together for collectively making 
sense of experience’ (Mercer 2000, 1). But if what is meant here is nothing more than 
a bringing of language to bear on experience (as if our experience were not already 
bound up with our language), then Mercer’s concept of interthinking does not help us 
to see how the reflective practice conversation might be revitalised. The etymology of 
‘sense’ (in Mercer’s ‘making sense of experience’) hints at something richer than just 
 
 
‘understanding’. From the French sens we are reminded of ‘way’ in Greek (logos) and 
in Chinese (Tao). Perhaps if interthinking is about making our way, our logos 
together, then we are getting closer to envisioning the kind of con-versation6 that 
enables us to live meaningfully with our words alongside others. 
I suggest that in the scenario conversation a number of relationships are being 
played out: between the teacher and trainee; between each individual and her words - 
the truth of what is said -and, finally, the relationship of each individual to herself. 
 
 
 
5   On this point, see, for example, the work of Nel Noddings (1992, 1993) and David 
Carr (2003). 
 
6 The Latin roots of ‘con-versation’ are significant here: that in talking we are 
‘turning’ (vertere) with (cum) others. 
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The teacher’s conversation here seems like that of a rhetorician, impressing on the 
trainee the dominant discourses to which she herself is subject and which the trainee 
must replicate: those of standards and of achievement. We might think of this in 
relation to what Mercer calls ‘disputational talk’, the purpose of which is to privilege a 
certain position (2007, 97). Let me try this out in relation to the scenario. The teacher 
challenges the trainee regarding how she has failed to make considered use of self- 
assessment: ‘Well’ she says, ‘You shouldn’t be restricting this to just one lesson, 
otherwise it all looks a bit ad hoc. Here our speaker is fully intent on asserting and 
defending her own position But the trainee, well versed now in this discourse, resorts 
to a form of flattery, to an easy acquiescence with the words and ideas of the teacher; 
she merely replies: ‘I know, yeah’. This is similar to what Mercer calls ‘cumulative 
talk’, where one speaker supports the position of another (2000, 97). This is not to 
generalise, but rather to recognise that such conversations and relationships are 
indicative of a certain culture within education. It is as if something in this culture 
steeps those who pass through it in particular ways of thinking and talking that block 
and force out other ways. But just as certain topics of conversation are ‘allowed’, 
others are off-limits, excluded. The trainee tries to raise an issue that has been 
exercising her for some time: the relationship that she feels she has with the Head of 
Department in the school where she is undertaking her placement. Her language 
betrays an ongoing concern; she says that she ‘still’ finds it difficult to talk to this 
person, and that she’s ‘mentioned it before’ in previous conversations. But the 
teacher’s response is telling: she interrupts the trainee, dismisses this particular topic 
of conversation, and re-focuses the trainee on what really matters, on completing the 
placement and on meeting the standards. Such a closing down of the conversation 
happens certainly because of time constraints, but may also be indicative of a certain 
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cultural expectation, a preoccupation with what really matters at the expense of a 
space for frank speaking about the everyday stuff of teaching. What would it be like, 
for example, if there were space within the reflective practice conversation for a 
trainee to say: ‘I’m sick of teaching. I don’t even like the kids that much any more. 
It’s just not what I hoped it would be’? 
What I am drawing attention to here is not characteristic of educational 
contexts alone, but of our human condition; it is what Foucault calls our 
subjectivation. This results in a form of silencing, a voicelessness that prevents frank 
speaking. If we do not recognise what is stale and lifeless in this kind of 
conversation, we are, as Stanley Cavell points out7: 
 
 
 
stopped short in the obligation to make our desires, hence our actions, 
intelligible …. and hampered in our demand and right to be found intelligible 
in those desires and actions, to ask residence in the shared realm of reason. 
(Cavell 2005, 188) 
 
Cavell has written not only about his own voice in philosophy (1994), and about how 
Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau are the (repressed) voice of 
American philosophy (1994a) ,  but also about crises of expression and voicelessness 
in his readings of Hollywood film (1996)8. For the heroines in the films that Cavell 
identifies as ‘melodramas of the unknown woman’,9  there is hope for the recovery of 
 
 
 
 
7   Cavell is talking here specifically of ‘the role of ordinary language in relation to the 
imperative of expression’ (2005, 188). I use the quotation here, though, as it captures in 
a particularly articulate way the point I am pursuing about the need for a revitalised 
form of conversation. 
 
8   See also Fulford, A. 2009. Ventriloquising the voice: Writing in the university. 
Journal of Philosophy of Education 43, no. 2: 223 – 237. 
 
9   Cavell (1996, 3) identifies the following films as representative of the genre: Stella 
Dallas,(1937) Now Voyager (1942) and Gaslight (1944). 
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voice, an initiation into a way of speaking that has been previously blocked. But there 
is a danger in talking about a renewed kind of reflective practice conversation for 
education in terms of ‘recovery’ of voice, as if the discourses to which we are subject 
in our human condition could somehow be laid aside. We have a consistent propensity 
to inauthenticity, as Heidegger would put it; we cannot step outside the discourses that 
structure our Being-in-the-world. Living inauthentically means to be cut off from a 
certain expressiveness, from a capacity to have what Richard Polt calls a ‘decisive 
and clear-sighted way of being oneself’ (2005, 3).  For Emerson and Thoreau, our 
lives are lived in a constant battle against conformity; but this is not a battle we can 
win, we can only ever struggle to be self-reliant, to speak frankly. But what does this 
struggle consist of? How might we open up ways of thinking about our conversation 
that avoid rhetoric and flattery, or, as Finn Daniel Raaen puts it, ‘break with 
modernity’s normalising discourses’? (2011, 631). How might we give account of 
ourselves and speak the truth? One possibility for conversation is to consider Michel 
Foucault’s discussion of the ancient Greek notion of parrhēsia, of ‘frank’ or ‘fearless 
speech’ (Foucault 2001, 2005), and it is to this that I now turn. 
 
 
 
Parrhēsia, rhetoric and flattery 
 
 
The term parrhēsia, often translated as ‘frank speaking’ (franc-parler in French, 
Freimütigkeit in German), first appears in the Greek literature of Euripides in whose 
plays it occurs as a characteristic of Athenian democracy. It is a guideline for 
democracy in terms of how individuals should behave towards each other and in the 
assembly, a characteristic of the good citizen, a moral obligation and a personal virtue 
(Foucault 2001). Foucault stresses how parrhēsia is strongly opposed to other forms 
of conversation: to chattering, rhetoric and flattery. Chattering implies saying all that 
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one has in mind, but without qualification of what is said; rhetoric’s primary purpose 
is to persuade, not necessarily to speak the truth frankly. The opposition of rhetoric 
and parrhēsia is clear in both Plato’s Gorgias and in the Phaedrus where the 
distinction is between the logos that speaks the truth and the logos that is not capable 
of truth. 
Foucault identifies a distinct form of Socratic parrhēsia which ‘tries to shape 
the specific relationships individuals have to themselves’ (2001, 106). Socrates, as 
parrhēsiastes, addresses an individual and engages in dialogue; the listener, for his 
part, responds and gives account of himself. The intention here was not to elicit some 
form of narrative in an autobiographical or confessional sense, but rather to allow the 
speaker to demonstrate a relation between their rational discourse, logos, and the 
manner in which they live their life. In short, the parrhēsiastic conversation shows 
that the logos gives form to a life. Socratic parrhēsia, underpinned by the requirement 
to care for others and for the self, might necessitate a significant changing of one’s 
life. This amounts not merely to altering one’s own beliefs, but might entail a more 
radical changing of one’s style of life, relation to others and relation to the self. 
The relationship to truth is key in the notion of Socratic parrhēsia; speaking 
the truth in this way entails risk. For a parrhēsiastes who confronts a tyrannical leader 
with the effect of his unjust policies, the risk could be punishment, exile, or even 
death. But the parrhēsiastes, unlike the rhetorician or flatterer, cannot stay silent in 
the face of this danger, and this sets up a particular relationship to the self. In this 
sense, there is a care for the self that is at the heart of Socratic practice of parrhēsia10. 
Care for the self - the attention to the perfection of the soul - and the requirement to 
 
10   Foucault notes that Socratic (or philosophical) parrhēsia is closely associated with 
the notion of the care of the self, and this is clearly shown in the parrhesiastic role 
Socrates plays in the Alcibiades Major (see Foucault 2001). 
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care for others, follow from the practice of parrhēsia. In particular, there must be 
attention to the relationship between the logoi, the words spoken, and the bios, the 
manner of the life led such that words (logoi) and deeds (erga) are in harmony. 
 
 
 
Parrhēsia: fearless speech in education 
To champion parrhēsia as a preferred form of conversation in education11 would be 
too simplistic. It would be to ignore some of its most basic characteristics that render 
its easily transferability between settings more difficult; foremost among these is the 
fact that the ancient practice of parrhēsia commonly entailed risk – mortal risk12. That 
risk is still present today for some who speak to challenge tyrannical regimes in their 
countries. But the risk for our teacher or trainee in speaking frankly is plainly not the 
same. A trainee who speaks out may risk having her judgement questioned, and her 
achievement of high grades in assessments and perhaps even her ultimate success on 
the course might be put at risk. Similarly, the teacher may not be immune from the 
 
 
 
 
11   I would not want to argue that this kind of conversation is useful for considering 
teacher training alone. There are other contexts in education where the practice of 
frank speaking and truth telling, informed by the notion of parrhēsia, might also be 
richly explored. There are possibilities, for example, for the lecturer/student tutorial in 
the university. Recently, Papadimos and Murray (2008) argued that parrhēsia should 
be considered as an ethical response to the American Medical Association’s 
identification of a gap in the education of medical students, and that it could 
contribute to the enhancement of their training and mentoring. This is interesting 
because it considers the training of professionals, and thus has relevance also to the 
training of teachers This is not to ignore the vast literature, not least in sociology, on 
professions and professionals. For this debate in education, see for example, Jane 
Green’s discussion (Green 2011), but also Martinez, Desiderio and Papakonstantinou 
(2010) and Campbell (2008). 
 
12 I am reminded of this in just one example: at the time of writing this paper, BBC 
Radio 4 is broadcasting its 2011 series of Reith lectures. One of the invited lecturers is 
the Burmese pro-democracy leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, who acknowledges in her 
second lecture (recorded secretly in Burma) that, despite being freed from her latest 
period of house arrest, she risks her life by continuing to speak publicly against the 
regime. 
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consequences of what Foucault calls the ‘parrhēsiastic game’ (2001, 17). Speaking 
frankly against the latest policy imperatives and curricular requirements risks at the 
very least her being called to question by managers, inspectorate bodies and funding 
providers. But our teacher is no tyrant, and the authorities that the teacher may choose 
to speak out against could hardly be described in such terms. It would be a mistake, 
however, to suppose that Foucault sees parrhēsia as a matter of rare, heightened 
experience: on the contrary, his concern is with the stuff of our ordinary lives, and the 
inevitable responsibilities that attach to what we say and think. 
But even if the conversation between our teacher and trainee is of the more 
ordinary stuff of our daily lives, we still need to explore something of the very nature 
of frank speaking. In our scenario the teacher is forthright in her criticism of the 
trainee using the somewhat derogatory term ‘ad hoc’ in relation to the trainee’s 
assessment practice. Without doubt, this comment is bluntly critical, but is it frank 
speaking? It appears that both the teacher and the trainee tell the truth. The trainee 
admits to being pushed for time and to not being more comprehensively prepared for 
teaching the lesson. The teacher refuses to be pressed on whether the trainee will 
achieve an overall outstanding grade for her placement. When asked directly, she tells 
the truth: ‘We’ll see’. This may not be so much an example of parrhēsia, as a 
conversation showing both the teacher and the trainee in the grip of certain dominant 
discourses that limit the dialogue so that certain topics are then off-limits. But it is not 
easy to say what would constitute a parrhēsiastic conversation here; moreover it is 
difficult to state that any utterance (or indeed the inclusion of any topic) is 
parrhesiastic just by virtue of the words (or themes) themselves. The context in which 
those words are said, and their intended force (about which I will need to say more in 
my discussion of Austin’s work later) are crucial. 
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Any discussion of parrhēsia and its possibilities in contemporary educational 
practice must address the insistence on speaking the truth that is at the heart of the 
parrhēsiastic conversation. The ancient parrhēsiastes knows what he says is true 
because he possesses certain moral qualities that guarantee his access to the truth. 
Even if we could lay aside the tricky issue of access to the truth here, let me try out a 
further thought. I want to consider under what circumstances not speaking the truth 
would be an appropriate response to a trainee teacher (since, as Raaen points out, 
parrhēsia does not imply telling the truth no matter what). I think of an example 
where the teacher, knowing the trainee is both lacking in confidence and at a point of 
crisis, says after she has observed her teaching a mediocre lesson: ‘That was great! 
Well done!’ Is this frank speaking? And is it truth-telling? Clearly it is not true at a 
propositional level - the lesson was only mediocre, not a great one. But what the 
teacher has done here is truly acknowledged the situation in which the trainee finds 
herself; the teacher is fully engaged with it. Because she has measured the context 
well, and is sensitive to what needs to be said, she is fully present in the words she 
speaks. She gives her words a nuanced exaggeration to help the trainee achieve the 
greater confidence that she lacks. This is precisely what this discursive, ethical 
context demands. It is not that the factual elements of this situation are irrelevant (the 
mediocrity of the lesson, judged, presumably, according to certain external standards), 
but that meaning in language cannot be divorced from what Cavell calls its 
perlocutionary effects. 
But even taking account of these cautions, can parrhēsia be useful in re- 
conceiving the conversation between teacher and trainee? In imagining how current 
practices could be thought of otherwise, I am not advocating that parrhēsia should, or 
even could, be taught in some way as a desirable skill, nor am I arguing that parrhēsia 
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is in some way a further stage of development from the reflective practice 
conversation – an ‘extension activity’ for those who are ‘more able’ or even a practice 
pertinent to particular elements of the professional standards. Parrhēsia is not some 
kind of trophy, with reflective practice considered as a somewhat shameful 
alternative. Perhaps what parrhēsia can open up are opportunities for recognising how 
we are in the grip of certain powerful discourses, the multiple ways in which we fail to 
speak our minds. In coming to a recognition of this - to use Thoreau’s words from 
Walden - to be awakened ‘not by the mechanical nudgings of some servitor…but by 
our own newly acquired force and aspirations…to a higher life we fell asleep from’ 
(1854/1999, 82), we are able to begin to speak our mind. It is through such 
opportunities for frank speaking that teachers reflect on and discuss their practice not 
just as skilled technicians, but as individuals with responsibilities for themselves, for 
their pupils and for others in the profession. 
If flattery and rhetoric in the teacher/trainee conversation in some way serve to 
illustrate the inauthenticity of our human condition, then a parrhēsiastic conversation, 
characterised by challenge and uncertainty, is a site of transformation for the 
individual; some might call it a ‘conversion’ (Papadimos and Murray 2008, 4). This 
view of the development of, and the responsibility to, the self is a far richer one than 
many current iterations of reflective practice offer. In the context of teaching, both the 
teacher and the trainee benefit from the parrhēsiastic game. The parrhēsiastes herself 
has no personal interest in the exercise of parrhēsia; it is in some sense her gift, 
engendered by generosity. But she recognises her role to ‘act on them (the trainees) so 
that they come to build up a relationship of sovereignty to themselves with regard to 
themselves’ (Foucault 2005, 385). The trainee teacher herself also has a responsibility. 
Having heard the truth spoken by the parrhēsiastes, she has some accountability to 
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others; it is as if she says: ‘I must respond - I am encouraged, called upon, and obliged 
to respond - to the words of truth that teach me the truth and consequently help me in 
my salvation, with a discourse of truth by which I open the truth of my own soul to 
the other, to others’ (Foucault 2005, 391). The parrhēsiastic game, perceived in this 
way as a commitment towards the building of a relationship of truth that is rooted in 
the care of the other and of the self, should be part of the ethical pursuit of teachers 
and of teaching itself. 
 
 
 
Doing things with words: John Austin’s performative utterances 
 
 
Parrhēsia is just one possibility for a revitalised conversation in education. But in 
thinking further about how language shapes our relationships - particularly through 
forms of linguistic exchange or conversation - I move now to consider Cavell’s 
writing on what he calls ‘passionate utterance’ (2005, 155). This is both an 
extension of, and departure from, Austin’s theory of the performative in language. For 
those not familiar with this, I start by providing a very brief overview. 
Austin’s interest lies in a category of expressions which are not constatives,13 
but which are plainly not nonsense. Take for example: ‘I name this ship the Queen 
Elizabeth’ (Austin 1979, 235). He writes of such utterances, which he calls 
‘performatives’, in this way: 
 
 
 
 
 
If a person makes an utterance of this sort we should say that he is doing 
something rather than merely saying something…. In saying what I do, I 
actually perform that action….I am indulging in it. (Austin 1979, 235) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13   Constatives can be thought of in terms of truth and falsity. 
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Austin identifies a number of conditions that must be satisfied for an utterance to be 
classed as performative, and calls these ‘felicity conditions.’14 However, Austin 
makes a remarkable reversal when he concludes that what holds for constative 
utterances (that they can be thought about in terms of truth or falsity) also holds for 
performatives, so collapsing the very distinction he originally set up. He takes the 
utterance ‘I apologize’, and notes that for it to be a performative, it must meet certain 
felicity conditions: that the person apologising must have the very feelings that lead 
her to the utterance, and that she conducts herself in accordance with the apology 
thereafter. In this sense, then, it is not only happy (felicitous), but also true (Austin 
1975). So if the constative/performative distinction breaks down, how does Austin 
move forward? He advises re-assessing all the ways in which saying anything is doing 
anything at all. This will lead us, he claims, not to focus only on what a word means, 
but also to consider the ‘force’ of the utterance (1979, 251). Austin then proposes a 
ternary model that distinguishes utterances in terms of their locutionary aspect (of 
saying something meaningful); illocutionary force (of doing something in saying 
something) and perlocutionary effect (of doing something by saying something). 
Perhaps we should take up Cavell again at this point. Austin’s interest is in how the 
illocutionary force of words relates to the act of performance; Cavell, in contrast, 
takes up the perlocutionary force of language to draw attention to what he calls 
philosophy’s tendency to ‘discount the role of passion in human life, as if that 
discounting might be a step toward a welcome reduction of it’ (2005, 156). 
 
 
 
 
14   Austin’s felicity (or happiness) conditions are summarised as follows: the utterance 
must take place as part of a conventional procedure where the context and people 
involved are appropriate; the procedure must be executed completely and in an 
appropriate fashion; the utterance must be backed by appropriate feelings by the 
people involved who must conduct themselves accordingly afterwards. 
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Stanley Cavell and passionate utterance 
 
 
In opening up his discussion of the perlocutionary effects of language, Cavell 
develops the idea of what he calls ‘passionate utterance’ (2005, 155). Cavell sees in 
Austin’s felicity conditions what amounts to the working of conventional 
procedures,15 but, whilst clearly inspired by Austin’s work, wants to move beyond 
this, and draws the following distinction: 
 
 
 
A performative utterance is an offer of participation in the order of law. And 
perhaps we can say: A passionate utterance is an invitation to improvisation in 
the disorders of desire. (2005, 185) 
 
 
 
To talk of passionate utterance, and of desire, perhaps brings to mind certain 
contexts: the intimate exchange between lovers, or even a frenzied argument between 
sworn enemies. Though these might well be the scene of passionate utterance, they 
are extreme examples. Cavell’s passionate utterance might well take place in much 
more mundane contexts (the conversation between a teacher and a trainee, perhaps?). 
So whilst the passionate can relate to the expression of strong feelings, it is also there 
in the everyday expression of our feelings that are characteristic of our ordinary lives. 
In this sense, even the expression of a feeling of indifference might be thought of as 
passionate utterance. A teacher who, in response to a colleague’s comment on a new 
classroom assessment policy, says: ‘I can’t see how that will help’, expresses genuine 
feelings. Let me explain why I consider this to be passionate utterance. It is 
 
15   Cavell considers whether there are conditions for the successful functioning of 
perlocutionary utterances that might align to Austin’s felicity conditions for 
performatives. What he demonstrates is that it is difficult to find analogous 
perlocutionary conditions. 
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not the relationship between the speakers themselves that needs to be ‘passionate’ (in 
terms of, for example, wild desire or intense hatred), but rather that what is said is 
spoken from genuine emotion, the expression of which has an effect on the person 
addressed such that she must respond. If a precise definition of passionate utterance 
fails to grasp what Cavell is trying to convey in the very idea of it -  that is to say, that 
to provide a formula for passionate utterance would be to miss the point - then we can 
say what the motivation for passionate utterance is. Cavell writes: ‘The setting or 
staging of my perlocutionary invocation or provocation, or confrontation, backed by 
no conventional procedure, is grounded in my being moved to speak, hence to speak 
in, or out of, passion’ (2005, 181). Unlike constatives which can assert or inform, the 
examples of passionate utterance that Cavell offers demonstrate their expressive 
nature, their capacity to excite emotion.16 
A passionate utterance, then, is an invitation to a form of exchange, one in 
which a speaker invokes or provokes the words of another. How is this different, 
though, from any utterance said by one to another? It is perhaps that to a greater 
degree the invitation to respond is made without knowing its effects, whether the 
invitation will be accepted, postponed or rejected, and what the consequences of this 
might be. In writing about the ‘disorders of desire’, Cavell is drawing attention to just 
such perlocutionary effects of language. Passionate utterances, unlike illocutions, do 
not have a distinct ending (once the ‘performance’ is complete). In the passionate 
utterance a speaker invokes or provokes the words of another; speaking out of 
 
16   Cavell lists the following as examples of the passionate utterance: 
a.   ‘I’m bored.’ 
b.   ‘You know he took what you said as a promise.’ (Roughly, a rebuke from 
Margaret Schlegel to Mr Wilcox in Howard’s End. 
c.   ‘Monster, felon, deceiver!’ (Donna Elvira to Don Giovanni). 
d.   ‘Carmen, I love you.’ (End of Don José’s Flower Song)  (Cavell 2005, 177). 
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passion, they invite a linguistic exchange that is the working out of a particular 
relationship. This is not to say (to repeat) that the passionate utterance can only be 
expressed by those with a particular relationship: by those who are, for example, 
lifelong friends, lovers or even sworn enemies. What Cavell hints at, rather, is a 
context for passionate utterance where, although perfectly ordinary words may be 
used (just as in Cavell’s example, ‘I’m bored’), the perlocutionary effect of the 
utterance is marked. Cavell says this of such effects: ‘once issued, each [passionate 
utterance] appears as deeply characteristic and revelatory of both the utterer and his or 
her addressee’ (2005, 180). It is in the laying bare of motivations, of commitments 
and of thoughts that the passionate utterance is most readily exemplified.17 
 
 
Even though Cavell describes passionate utterance in terms of exchange, there 
is an important point to be made here regarding how we commonly think of this term. 
To think of exchange here as an act of giving and of receiving, in terms therefore of 
reciprocity, would be to ignore the fact that the invitation to exchange may be 
questioned, dismissed out of hand or just postponed. But it is in the offer of exchange 
that Cavell claims that we ‘declare our standing’ with each other, that we ‘stake our 
future together’ (2005, 185). So there is risk in passionate utterance, as in the practice 
of parrhēsia - but it is the risk of refusal to accept the invitation to exchange, and 
what this implies. In the demand for a response, Cavell notes that ‘I make myself 
 
 
17   See my paper considering student writing in the university (Fulford 2009), where I 
draw attention to Cavell’s reading of the Hollywood film Gaslight. In one of the final 
scenes of this film there is arguably an example of the passionate exchange. Paula 
Anton, the film’s heroine, has been driven to the verge of derangement by her 
murderous husband, Gregory. He is seen frantically searching for hidden family 
jewels in the attic of their home, and Paula is in the house with her friend, Cameron, a 
detective. Acutely aware of Paula’s state of mind, and of the evil intents of her 
murderous husband, Cameron asks of the terrified Paula: ‘Mrs Anton, you know, 
don’t you. You know who’s up there, don’t you?’ Paula accepts the invitation, engages 
in the exchange: ‘No, no’. But Cameron persists ‘Are you sure you don’t?’ And she 
replies ‘No. No, how could he be?’ 
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vulnerable to your rebuke’ (2005, 185). My speaking from passion means that I must 
also be ‘suffering the passion’ (2005, 181) and that each instance of such an utterance 
‘risks, if not costs, blood’ (2005, 187). Let us return again to our scenario and imagine 
how the (risky) conversation might run. The trainee, still concerned about her 
relationship with the Head of Department, listens as the teacher says this to her: ‘But 
it’s not her that’s the problem. You know, I’ve often found you quite a difficult person 
to talk to, especially when I’m saying something constructively critical to you.’ The 
risk here may be one of embarrassment, anger, perhaps even self-doubt for the 
trainee; but such is the risk of frank-speaking or of the passionate exchange. 
 
 
There is no suggestion here that our engaging in a parrhēsiastic conversation, 
or indeed, inviting an exchange invoked by a passionate utterance, are competing 
forms of conversation in or about education. I would want to strongly resist the idea 
that these possibilities of language are in some way strategic choices for the speaker. 
In drawing attention to these possibilities in language, I am accentuating two things: 
first, the perlocutionary effects of our words and the responsibility that such effects 
realise, and second, the manner in which relationships can be negotiated and renewed 
through conversation. To flesh this out further, I turn to some of the films of which 
Cavell has written as a means of illustrating these points. 
To see how these characteristics play out in the remarriage films, let us 
consider one example, the 1949 film Adam’s Rib directed by George Cukor. Here 
Spencer Tracey plays Adam Bonner, a District Attorney who is married to Amanda, 
an Attorney at Law played by Katharine Hepburn. The film opens with a scene 
showing a woman, Doris Attinger, shooting and injuring her husband (whom she 
believes has been unfaithful). The marriage crisis, a feature of the genre of the 
Hollywood comedies of remarriage, comes about when Adam Bonner is assigned the 
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Attinger case, and phones Amanda with news of the assignment. Amanda, believing 
Doris to have been wronged, decides to handle her defence, and breaks the news to 
her husband and guests at a dinner party that same evening. This leads to what Cavell 
calls an ‘enforced silence’ between the couple (2004, 71), a fracturing not only of 
conversation between the pair, but also of their relationship. Both parties speak, but 
fail to say what is really on their minds, what really matters. Here, just as in our 
scenario, the conversation is limited to those topics that are authorised, and anything 
else is blocked. This is clearly illustrated at one point in Adam’s terse rejoinder to his 
wife: ‘Excuse me, may I say just one thing? Save your eloquence for the jury!’ 
Amanda speaks from her passion (passion not only for the case, and for her 
belief in Doris’ innocence, but also for the hope of a married life on their dream farm 
in the country) when she asks Adam: ‘Shouldn’t we talk about it? Don’t you want to 
hear my side? Don’t you want to talk to me?’ This is her invocation, her appeal to 
exchange; but it is also the couple’s ‘crisis, or impasse, of mutual credibility’ (Cavell 
2004, 381), the refusal of the invitation – or at least its postponement. 
 
 
It is only in the final scenes of this film, when Amanda has won the Attinger 
case, that what we might variously describe as frank speaking, as an acceptance to 
exchange in passionate utterance, is witnessed. Adam and Amanda visit their 
accountant, Jules Frick, who is bemused by the conversation between the pair as they 
discuss the tax deductibility of seeming trifles: a bet, a gift of underwear, seeds for the 
garden. But the accountant’s mention of one large payment triggers an exchange that 
we might think of in terms of the Cavellian passionate exchange. In this poignant 
scene the conversation reveals something about the speakers that allows them to 
speak frankly and out of passion for what is really important: their house in the 
country and their future life together: 
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Jules: ‘And this, $8,740.30? What’s that?’ 
Adam ‘That’s the last payment on the farm’ 
Amanda ‘We own it now – every scrap’ 
Adam ‘It took us six years’ 
Amanda ‘But we made it’ 
Adam ‘Free and clear’ 
Amanda ‘Yeah’ 
 
 
(Adam begins to cry) 
 
 
Amanda ‘Listen Pinky’18 
Adam ‘What?’ 
Amanda ‘If we started out now, we could get there in time for dinner’ 
Adam ‘You mean, and see the dogs?’ 
Amanda ‘Of course, there’s not much in the freezer’ 
Adam ‘You don’t want to go’ 
Amanda ‘Come on, come on’ 
Adam ‘Where?’ 
Amanda ‘Home’ 
Adam ‘Back to the farm’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A conversation for education 
 
 
So what can we say, then, about the extract of conversation in our opening scenario? 
In one sense, there is nothing at all wrong with it. Feedback is given and, it appears, 
understood by the trainee. An inspector, assessing the quality of the trainee’s 
programme of study and her progress on the course, may think that this feedback 
conversation is exemplary: the trainee is encouraged to reflect on the lesson; she is set 
a specific target for improvement, and the teacher’s feedback clearly relates to the 
professional standards which the trainee is working to achieve. But this is not all that 
is at stake here. To take a view of language as merely providing a means of exchange 
of information would be to ignore what is possible in our conversation and what the 
implications are of this for those involved. But how might these possibilities of 
language enable a different kind of conversation about education? This would not be 
18 ‘Pinky’ is the nick-name Amanda uses for her husband throughout the film. 
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to think of these ideas in terms of developing a curriculum for teacher trainers or a 
formula for them to follow in giving feedback. It is not even that this ‘different kind’ 
of conversation precludes the topics for discussion or the contexts for conversation 
that I have described. This is not a call to abandon existing reflective practice 
procedures, nor indeed is it a claim that nothing usefully can be said in such 
conversations. It is not the case that I am arguing for a particular mode of speech or 
the adoption of a prescribed procedures or rituals for speaking; indeed such 
approaches would risk undermining the very nature of parrhēsia itself. 
What I am calling attention to is how such conversations can be opened up, 
and what this would then allow. It is a call to a form of conversation about education 
that is rooted in the passion for what it means to educate and be educated. It is a 
conversation that challenges, that risks frank speaking and that demands a response. 
Such conversation requires, following Cavell, ‘an attitude toward or investment in 
words… an attitude allegorical of an investment in our lives that I believe those 
trained in professional philosophy are trained to disapprove of ’ (Cavell 1990, 34). 
This attitude to words of which Cavell writes is not a matter simply of using the latest 
terminology or of repeating the most recent policy agendas. What Cavell hints at is 
something much richer in our relationship to language: an attention to the expressive 
in our speech, to the perlocutionary force of our words. It is the taking on of this 
responsibility for our words that allows our being fully present in them; perhaps this 
is also the kind of conversation that some in education would be likely to disapprove 
of. 
The conversation that I envisage is of course not one that is necessarily limited 
to the context of teacher training; I used this here merely as an example to explore the 
possibilities. A conversation characterised by frank speaking, by challenge and by 
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invitation to respond could equally take place in the school classroom19 as well as the 
university tutorial. To talk frankly about education in this way would be to find our 
voice in it. 
But we might say that our teacher and trainee already have a voice in the 
conversation: they speak frankly about what matters. The trainee is concerned about 
doing the right thing in the classroom, about the quality of her teaching, the 
achievement of the highest grades and her successful entry into the profession. 
Similarly the teacher is keen to do all that she can to facilitate the trainee’s success, to 
keep her focussed, to provide feedback that helps to improve her practice. Both have 
made a kind of investment. But the investment in words of which Cavell speaks is one 
where we do not simply borrow words and pass them back - regurgitate the prevalent 
discourses, or to use Thoreau’s metaphor, pass the axe back without first sharpening 
it. It is rather an investment that might come through a type of conversation where we 
come to recognise our own subjectivation and how we can speak out from, as it were, 
within it.20 It is this moment that is perhaps reflected in Cavell: 
 
 
 
Until we are capable of serious speech again – i.e., are reborn, are men 
“[speaking] in a waking moment, to men in their waking moments”21 – our 
words do not carry our convictions, we cannot fully back them, because either 
we are careless of our own convictions, or think we haven’t any, or imagine 
they are inexpressible. They are merely unutterable. (Cavell 1981, 34) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19   Ian Munday’s (2009) paper considers, for example, Cavell’s idea of the passionate 
utterance in relation to moral education in schools when he responds to Michael Hand 
and his discussion of the teaching of homosexuality as a controversial issue (Hand 
2007). 
 
20 Raaen refers this as ‘averting stagnation’ (2011, 632). 
 
21   Here Cavell is quoting from Thoreau’s Walden (Thoreau 1854/1999). 
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We might argue further, though, that we can think about this type of 
conversation not only as a possibility for talking about education, but as educative 
itself. Richard Smith makes a similar point in relation to philosophy when he 
illustrates how it might be thought of in such terms as ‘the enterprise of continuing 
conversations of an educative kind’ (2009, 438).  In his paper, Smith is writing 
primarily about the problem of thinking of philosophy as having a ‘method’. The 
majority of the paper is in the form of a dialogue, a conversation between a ‘teacher’ 
– George - and students who take part in a seminar discussing, amongst other things, 
Plato’s Phaedrus, the differences between the spoken and written word and the 
Rorty’s distinction between systematic and edifying philosophy. The fact that my 
concern here is not primarily with conversations about philosophy may not be that 
important: what I have tried to show is that serious conversations about education can, 
and perhaps should, be educative themselves. Let me explore this briefly in relation 
again to film, and try out an analogy. In the Hollywood comedies of remarriage, 
Cavell points to what he sees as two main themes of this genre: the woman’s ‘demand 
for an education’ by the man (1996, 13) and the man’s reciprocal struggle for 
knowledge of the woman. Conversation is central here to the way in which these 
themes play out, to what Cavell calls ‘the quarrel, the conversation of love’ (1981a, 
32). Relationships in education, between teacher and trainee or tutor and student, 
might be similarly revitalised through the kind of conversation that leads to 
knowledge of each other, to their mutual education. Quite clearly, the nature of the 
relationship between a teacher and trainee is different from that between the 
protagonists in the comedies of remarriage. Adam’s Rib shows moments of intimacy 
between Adam and Amanda as a married couple: the pair appear in several scenes 
together in the bedroom; they give each other a massage; use nicknames for each 
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other; engage in what Cavell refers to as ‘mild sexual bi-play’ (2004, 71). But there 
also exists a certain intimacy between teacher and trainee. Like in the marriage, it is a 
relationship built on trust, one where a break down in conversation threatens the very 
relationship itself. Perhaps this analogy is not entirely satisfactory, but it does draw 
attention to how the possibilities of conversation in which expressiveness, challenge 
and the demand for response are all key components, can lead to an enriching of an 
established relationship which is educative for both parties. 
To talk of a responsibility to our words, to our need for ‘serious 
 
 
speech’ (Cavell 1981, 34), is part of an ongoing encounter with our words. To be in 
conversation is a way of daily contesting our inauthenticity. Daniel Ross (2006), in 
writing about Cavell’s Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow,22 notes that in the 
remarriage comedies the marriage is reaffirmed at the end of the film. This does not 
mean, however, that the couple will not face the same challenges another day; the 
conversation – just as our relationship to words – will be an ongoing task. Cavell 
captures this same sentiment, this idea of a continual investment in our words and 
lives, when he describes Adam and Amanda Bonner in the final scene of Adam’s Rib: 
 
 
 
Hatted, as for departure, away from us, they resume their adventure of desire, 
their pursuit of happiness, sometimes talking, sometimes not, always in 
conversation. (1981a, 228) 
 
 
 
References 
 
 
Austin, J. L. 1975. How to do things with words. 2nd ed. Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Austin, J. L. 1979. Philosophical papers. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
 
 
 
22   Ross, D. 2006. Screening the Past. 
http://www.latrobe.edu.au/screeningthepast/19/philosophy-day-after-tomorrow.html 
(accessed June 29 2011). 
28 
 
Bradbury, H., N. Frost, S. Kilminster and M. Zukas, eds. 2010. Beyond reflective 
practice: New approaches to professional lifelong learning. New York and 
London: Routledge. 
Campbell, E. 2008. The ethics of teaching as a moral profession. Curriculum Inquiry 
38, no. 4: 357 – 385. 
Carr, D. 2003. Making sense of education: An introduction to the philosophy and 
theory of education and teaching. Abingdon: Routledge. 
Cavell, S. 1981. The senses of Walden. San Francisco: North Point Press. 
Cavell, S.1981a. Pursuits of happiness: The Hollywood comedy of remarriage. 
Cambridge MS: Harvard University Press. 
Cavell, S. 1990. Conditions handsome and unhandsome: The constitution of 
Emersonian perfectionism. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Cavell, S. 
1994. A pitch of philosophy: Autobiographical exercises. Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Cavell, S. 1994a. In quest of the ordinary: Lines of skepticism and romanticism. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Cavell, S. 1996. Contesting tears: The Hollywood melodrama of the unknown woman. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Cavell, S. 2004. Cities of words: Pedagogical letters on a register of the moral life. 
Cambridge MS: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
Cavell, S. 2005. Philosophy the day after tomorrow. Cambridge MA: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press. 
Foucault, M. 2001. Fearless speech. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e). 
Foucault, M. 2005. The hermeneutics of the subject: Lectures at the Collège de 
France, 1981-82. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Fulford, A. 2009. Ventriloquising the voice: Writing in the university. Journal of 
Philosophy of Education 43, no. 2: 223 – 237. 
Gee, J.P. 2005. An introduction to discourse analysis: Theory and method, 2nd ed. 
London: Routledge. 
Green, J. 2011. Education, professionalism and the quest for Accountability. New 
York: Routledge. 
Hand, M. 2007. Should we teach homosexuality as a controversial issue? Theory and 
Research in Education 5, no. 1: 69 – 86. 
Johns, C. 1995. Framing learning through reflection with Carper’s fundamental ways 
of knowing in nursing. Journal of Advanced Nursing 22, no. 2: 226-234. 
Mann, K., J. Gordon and A. MacLeod. (2009). Reflection and reflective practice in 
health professions education. Advances in Health Science Education 14, no. 4: 
595-621. 
Martinez, D. M., M.F. Desiderio, and A. Papakonstantinou. 2010. Teaching: A job or a 
profession, the perception of educators. The Educational Forum, 74, no. 4: 
289 – 296. 
Mercer, N. 2000. Words and minds: How we use language to think together. London: 
Routledge. 
Munday, I. 2009. Passionate utterance and moral education. Journal of Philosophy of 
Education 43, no. 1: 57 – 74. 
Noddings, N. 1992. The challenge to care in schools: An alternative approach to 
education. New York: Teachers’ College Press. 
29 
 
Noddings, N. 1993. Happiness and education. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Papadimos, T. J., and S.J. Murray. 2008. Foucault’s “Fearless Speech” and the 
transformation and mentoring of medical students. Philosophy, Ethics and 
Humanities in Medicine 3:12, 
http://www.springerlink.com/content/67648933n4615611/fulltext.pdf 
(accessed July 5, 2011). 
Polt, R., ed. 2005. Heidegger’s Being and Time: Critical essays. Lanham: Rowman 
and Littlefield. 
Raaen, F.D. 2011. Autonomy, candour and professional teacher practice: A discussion 
inspired by the later works of Michel Foucault. Journal of Philosophy of 
Education 45, no. 4: 627 – 641. 
Rolfe, G., D. Freshwater and M. Jasper, eds. 2001. Critical reflection for the nursing 
and helping professions. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Ross, D. 2006. Screening the Past. 
http://www.latrobe.edu.au/screeningthepast/19/philosophy-day-after- 
tomorrow.html (accessed June 29 2011). 
Schön, D.A. 1987. Educating the reflective practitioner: Towards a new design for 
teaching and learning in the professions. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Schön, D.A. 1991. The reflective practitioner: How professionals think in action. 
Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Smith, R. 2009. Between the lines: Philosophy, text and conversation. Journal of 
Philosophy of Education 43, no. 3: 437 – 449. 
Thoreau, H. 1854/1999. Walden. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Usher, R., R. Johnstone and I. Bryant, eds. 1995. Adult education and the postmodern 
challenge. London: Routledge. 
